CRN posted again another 11 essays by their implications and policy task force on the impacts of molecular manufacturing.

I'm barreling through them as we speak. I figured I'd take some time to comment on one that caught my eye.

Tom Craver's essay Safer Molecular Manufacturing Through Nanoblocks puts some meat on the bones of an idea that Chris Phoenix briefly described once: the idea that whole classes of products could be considered safe for public design and fabrication without needing to resort to a DRM-style "whitelist only" scheme that would prohibit nanofactories from building any design not reviewed for public safety and digitall signed by a civil authority. Such a practice would not only be a huge blow to innovation, but it would introduce a big incentive to crack the system instead of abiding by it.

Up until now, I had my doubts about Chris's assertion that certain classes of products could be exempted from this scheme. But in this essay, Tom Craver has elucidated a scheme that would do just that, and it seems plausible.

You can certainly read it yourself, but I found myself suggesting a small change to improve it, whch I'll post here.

Continued...

Nanoblocks are pre-fabricted, sophisticated blocks of atoms (molecules, I guess) that are larger than 100 nm in scale, at least. Some are computers, some motors, some structural, etc. Each can be tagged by type, and even by (semi)uniqueID, for forensic purposes. these are sold in various packs through existing physical delivery infrastructure - in markets, corner stores, shipped cross country, etc. Think razor blades, where the fabs themselves are razors.

nanoblocks are manipulable only by special tooltips. One kind of tip is required to assemble blocks, while another is required to disassemble them. For a lot of applications, "nanoscale", or even 100 nm scale, isn't necessary - even sub-millimeter scale would be sufficient. with such blocks, most products would be more like microtech - even the smallest devices would be visible (albeit barely) to the naked eye. It would still be enormously useful.

L1: assemblers and recyclers begin as L2 products for general public use, assembling an array of L1 blocks that do not include assembly or disassembly tips, prohibiting the manufacture of L1 products that can recursively assemble or disassemble any other product. Recyclers of L1 products remain L2 products, but are publically available in controlled forms to prevent fabrication of malicious free-range disassembly devices (see below).

After an initial trial period of limited L1, assembly tip nanoblocks can be released, allowing for recursive fab, but not for fab of free-range disassemblers.

Note that the initial assemblers (which are themselves L2 products which assemble L1 products) must be fabbed or recycled by L2 facilities. after the assembler tip L1 blocks are released, the second-generation assemblers will be L1 products that assemble L1 products (including recursive assembly of other L1/L1 fabs)

L2: assemblers and disassemblers are only usable by civil authorities in restricted high-security facilities. they work at the atomically precise level, able to assemble and disassemble any product. products include: recycle bins that can disassemble L1 products (only), for distribution to the public; free-ranging nanobots that can disassemble L1 products (only), for use only in warranted circumstances, or when carting away loose, lost L1 blocks (cleanup);

The best part: no damn annoying DRM, and no accompanying dangerously false sense of security.

Does this stop foreign crash programs creating their own atomically-precise fabs or defabs? no. What does? What it does do is keep the really dangerous (ie, really small) applications out of the hands of civilians, including, most importantly, small terrorist groups and well-meaning klutzes. the vast majority of beneficial apps are covered at the macroscale, while withholding most of the dangerous applications to civil authorities. Because civilians will be appeased by the available products, the motivation for civilians to crack the system will be reduced.

Note: having separate assembly and disassembly keys takes care of grey goo on two fronts: first, nanoblocks do not occur in nature. goobots might make a mess out of your can of raw blocks, then go hunting for your neighbors, etc, but reasonable precautions on storage of raw blocks can keep pesky goobots out of it.

second, disassembly tips are only available on L2 products, which can't be disassembled by L1 products, so no L1 products can disassemble existing products, as they would require if they were to attempt to recycle existing L1 nanoblock products in the wild to use to reproduce themselves.

So yeah, there are a number of capabilities you have to keep locked up with civic authorities; but there is a lot you can release.

Related: Nanofactory Security Design

Comments — Nato Welch 2006/05/08 22:28